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INTRODUCTION 
While consistency models were introduced into the psychological liter­
ature only an approximate decade ago, personality theories which follow a 
consistency model have achieved prominence within contemporary psychology. 
Though they may be traced in form and spirit to the earlier work of Heider 
(1944, 1946), most of the theoretical statements on consistency were pub­
lished in the 1950's (Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Cartwright & Harary, 1956; 
Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1953; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). 
These attempts to formulate cognitive consistency as a proposition amenable 
to empirical test have since proven the productive worth of the general 
model as a base for personality theorizing. 
In general, the consistency model considers personality to be deter­
mined more by the feedback from interaction with the world than it is by 
any inherent attributes of man (Maddi, 1968). Consistency positions con­
cern themselves much more with the compatability, congruence, or fit be­
tween various aspects or elements of content than with the specific nature 
of the content. An implication of such an eclectic contentual position is 
the model's emphasis on individual uniqueness, while retaining occasions for 
empirical rigor. 
The origins of a consistency model of personality lie within social 
psychology's concern with cognitive consistency as the means whereby the 
randomness of events is reduced, providing a stable framework of expecta­
tions within which action can occur. Though the various theoretical state­
ments have been proposed under a variety of names (symbolic psycho-logic, 
balance, dissonance, symmetry, congruity), they have in common the notion 
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that an individual tends to behave in ways that maximize his attaining both 
a consistency among his cognitions of himself (e.g., as between cognitions 
of his beliefs and actions) and a consistency among cognitions of himself 
and objects or persons in his environment. Inconsistency is assumed to re­
sult in a cognitive state of discomfort or disturbance which provides the 
energy and direction for behavior. It is this property which enables one 
to state the core idea succinctly: Individuals strive to reduce tension in 
their cognitive structure; we all like to keep our cognitive house in order. 
Since the appearance of the forementioned versions of the model, their gen­
eral and powerful principle has provided the point of theoretical departure 
for more personality and social psychological research than has any other 
one theoretical notion (McGuire, 1966). 
One such avenue of research has been the application of the consis­
tency model to situations of social exchange, particularly as the model is 
involved in fashioning conceptions of justice, fairness, and equity. After 
the early work of Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) on relative deprivation, 
in which deprivation or injustice was defined in a relative sense so that 
unfair violations of expectations were described as arising out of compari­
son with an acknowledged or unacknowledged standard, Romans (1961) made use 
of a quasi-economic vocabulary to more fully articulate a theory of dis­
tributive justice which has close ties with the basic consistency position. 
For Romans, a condition of distributive justice will exist among those who 
are in an exchange relationship when the profits of each, less costs in­
curred, are proportional to their respective investments. Profit consists 
of that which is received in an exchange, cost is that which is given up 
in an exchange, and investments are the relevant attributes that are brought 
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to the exchange, such as ability, effort, education, or experience. 
In making it explicit that it is the relation between the ratios of 
profits to investments which results in felt justice or injustice, this dis­
tinct contribution of Romans enables one to go beyond the concept of rela­
tive deprivation. As Adams (1965) has pointed out, an individual may feel 
deprived, but he feels deprived not merely because his rewards are less than 
he expected. Individuals may perceive their rewards as smaller when compar­
ing their rewards to those of another, yet they will not feel this state of 
affairs as being unjust, for persons obtaining higher rewards may be per­
ceived as deserving them. Their rewards are greater because their invest­
ments are greater. Romans (1961) has noted, then, that "Justice is a cur-
* 
ious mixture of equality within inequality" (p. 244). Romans model of 
distributive justice between two individuals, A and B, may be given in 
schematic form as follows: 
Other workers have given formal propositions which refer to the same 
principle and resemble Romans' quite closely, especially in that each in­
volves a social comparison. Sayles (1958, p. 98), for example, has conjec­
tured that factory workers compare their jobs to other jobs and establish 
the fairness of their wages as follows: 
A's rewards less A's costs 
A's investments 
B's rewards less B's costs 
B's investments 
Our importance in the plant _ Our earnings 
Any other group's importance Their earnings 
"Importance" may presumably be taken as equivalent to investments. When 
the comparative ratios are congruent, an equitable relationship will obtain 
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and satisfaction will be experienced, while an incongruence between the 
ratios will be accompanied by dissatisfaction. Thus, justice is portrayed 
as being a function of the perceived equality of the ratios of investments 
and rewards. Similarly, Patchen's (1961, p. 9) model postulates that em­
ployees make wage comparisons of the type: 
My pay , My position on dimensions related to pay 
His (their) pay ° His (their) position on dimensions related to pay 
Of particular note in Patchen's formulation is the greater explicitness he 
has given to the rewards which constitute "dimensions related to pay", spec­
ifying them as being attributes such as skill, education, and seniority. 
Finally, the underlying assumption of Jaques' (1956, 1961) model is the ex­
istence of apparently unconscious social norms of what constitutes a fair 
or equitable payment for any given level of work, "these norms being intui­
tively known by each individual" (Jaques, 1961, p. 17). At an equitable 
payment level, one feels that it is a fair return relative to the pay of 
others. 
Though Romans, Sayles, Patchen, and Jaques delineate some of the condi­
tions which define perceptions of justice and injustice in social exchanges, 
they fail to describe, other than in anecdotal fashion, the consequences of 
perceived injustice beyond "dissatisfaction". As Adams (1965) has objected: 
"Men do not simply become dissatisfied with conditions they perceive to be 
unjust. They usually do something about them" (p. 276). By building on the 
work just described, Adams (1963a, 1965) has offered a theory of inequity 
in social exchange which specifies both the antecedents of perceived injus­
tice and its consequences. 
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Adams (1965) defines inequity as follows: "Inequity exists for Person 
whenever he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the ratio 
of Other's outcomes to Other's inputs are unequal. This may happen either 
(a) when he and Other are in a direct exchange relationship or (b) when both 
are in an exchange relationship with a third party and Person compares him­
self to Other" (p. 280). Other is usually a different individual, but may 
be Person in another job or in another social role. Thus, Adams refers to 
an unequal relationship between the ratios of inputs and outcomes of two 
persons as the definitive condition of inequity. While Adams has indicated 
that his theoretical notions are relevant to any situation in which a social 
exchange takes place, explicitly or implicitly, whether between parent and 
child, teacher and student, therapist and patient, or coworkers, research 
has by and large been limited to only one aspect of the general case, i.e., 
wage inequity. 
Potential inputs in a job situation for the person (employee) are his 
education, intelligence, experience, training, skill, seniority, age, sex, 
ethnic background, social status, and very importantly, the effort he expends 
on the job. Though not formally proposed by Adams, one might consider per­
sonality to be germane. Under special circumstances other attributes will 
also be pertinent, such as personal appearance, health, possession of an 
automobile, and so on (Adams, 1963a). They are what the employee perceives 
as his investment in the exchange, for which he expects a just return. At­
tributes which can be perceived by the person as benefits derived from his 
participation in the exchange are identified as outcomes. Potential outcomes 
include such things as pay, rewards intrinsic to the job, seniority benefits, 
fringe benefits, job status and status symbols, and a variety of formally 
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and informally sanctioned privileges. In a manner analogous to inputs, 
outcomes are as perceived by the possessor. 
Adams does not imply that input and outcome variables are indepen­
dent, except conceptually, for it is in their imperfect intercorrelation 
that conditions of inequity arise. Reminiscent of Jaques (1961), Adams 
assumes that there exist normative expectations of what constitute "fair" 
correlations between inputs and outcomes. However, he transcends Jaques 
by grounding these expectations in the process of socialization, wherein 
the human organism leams what is appropriate reciprocation. The expecta­
tions of fair correlations "are formed-learned-during the process of so­
cialization, at home, at school, at work" (Adams, 1965, p. 279). 
A condition of equity exists when the ratio of inputs and outcomes 
are identical between two people. For example, a condition of equity will 
exist when both Person and Other exert high effort for low wages, as repre­
sented in the following: 
Other: Input _ Person: Input 
Outcome , Outcome , 
- low low 
Equity is also said to exist when both the inputs and outcomes of Other are 
higher or lower than both the inputs and outcomes of Person: 
Other: Input Person: Input 
Outcome , . , Outcome -high low 
Other: Input Person: Input^ ^^  ^
Outcome , Outcome , . , low high 
When the normative expectation for a comparative input/outcome balance 
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is violated, feelings of inequity will result. Inequity may be defined 
schematically in both an undercompensated and an overcompensated condition 
as follows; •- r • 
It is assumed that the threshold for feelings of inequity is higher when a 
person is overcompensated than when a person is undercompensated. Over-
rewards presumably can be perceived or rationalized as fortuitous or as se­
cretly deserved, so that the attendant guilt of overcompensation may be more 
easily tolerated than the attendant anger of undercompensation (Adams, 1965). 
However, the important point is that the individual can experience inequity 
and be motivated to reduce or resolve it in either case, for the general as­
sumption is that simple economic motivation is subordinate to the motivation 
to achieve consonance between perceived inputs and outcomes. 
Inequity can be reduced by Person in several ways: (1) by actually 
altering either one's inputs, one's outcomes, or both; (2) by cognitively 
distorting one's inputs or outcomes; (3) by leaving the field; (4) by 
altering or cognitively distorting Other's inputs or outcomes, or by forcing 
Other to leave the field; or (5) by changing to another comparison Other. 
Given the existence of inequity, any of these means of reduction are taken 
to be potentially available to Person. There are few explicit principles 
made about the choice of resolution, but it is assumed that Person will 
strive for maximally positive outcomes, will adopt the least effortful 
Other : Input 
Outcome 
< 
Person : Input 
Outcome 






resolution, and will act so as to preserve his self-concept and self-esteem 
(Adams, 1965). 
The majority of the experimental research has dealt with the behavioral 
modes of inequity resolution, by and large through the manipulation of in­
puts (Adams, 1963a, 1963b; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; 
Arrowood, 1961; Friedman & Goodman, 1967; Goodman & Friedman, 1968). In 
these studies, perceived job inputs (i.e., qualifications for the job, speci­
fied as previous experience) were varied by the experimenter while the out­
come of wage rate was held constant, inducing an inequity of overcompensa­
tion where Other is high input/high outcome and Person is low input/high 
outcome. In this traditional manipulation, subjects are made to feel either 
qualified or unqualified for the job before the actual work is begun, so 
that the research question becomes "How will the subject behave in order to 
reduce these feelings?". 
Several studies which have used the hourly pay schedule (Adams & Rosen­
baum, 1962; Arrowood, 1961; Goodman & Friedman, 1968) generally support 
Adams' theory in that they found that when subjects perceived their pay as 
inequitably large, their productivity was greater than when identical pay 
was perceived as equitable. There has been one study to date which has 
failed to obtain similar results supportive of equity theory. Friedman and 
Goodman (1967) found no significant differences in productivity between 
their experimental and control groups. They have reported, however, that 
when the factor of self-perception of qualifications is controlled, so that 
unqualified experimental subjects (mean productivity = 26.3) are compared 
with unqualified controls (mean productivity = 23.9), the overcompensated 
group produces more (but not significantly more) than the control group. 
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thus contributing some substantiation for the wage inequity-productivity 
hypothesis. 
Additional studies have shown that if subjects, under the same cir­
cumstances of overcompensation by unqualification, are paid on a piece 
rate schedule, they may either restrict their productivity so as not to 
add to the inequity already present (Adams, 1963a; Adams & Rosenbaum, 
1962; Goodman & Friedman, 1968), and/or increase their work quality so as 
to increase inputs per unit while the outcome per unit is constant (Adams, 
1963a, 1963b; Adams & Jacobsen, 1964; Goodman & Friedman, 1968), there­
by achieving a more equitable balance between inputs and outcomes. 
Two studies have used an approach which begins to allow for somewhat 
more rigorous tests of the theory than the traditional paradigm. They es­
tablished two equitable control conditions where, with Other = high input/ 
high outcome, the Person ratios were; high input/high outcome and low 
input/low outcome. These were contrasted with an inequitably overcompensa-
ted experimental condition of Other = high input/high outcome. Person = 
low input/high outcome under both the piece rate (Adams & Jacobsen, 1964) 
and the hourly (Goodman & Friedman, 1968) pay schedules. These studies 
demonstrated that significant differences between experimentals and con­
trols are not confined solely to the typical control condition when Other = 
high input/high outcome. Person = high input/high outcome, but are also 
obtained under a control of Other = high input/high outcome. Person = low 
input/low outcome. Thus, these two studies have provided evidence of the 
generality of Adams' rule for equity, i.e., that the ratio of inputs and 
outcomes be identical between two people. 
Inequity has been induced through a manipulation of outcomes instead 
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of through a manipulation of perceived inputs in several studies (Andrews, 
1967; Lawler & O'Gara, 1967), both of which examined the effects of an 
undercompensated piece rate. With this design, no Other is provided through 
experimental induction. Instead, Other is assumed to be Person in another 
previous job, or in a prior social role, a possibility which was suggested 
by Adams (1965). In each of these studies, piece rate was varied while per­
ceived job inputs were assumed constant by random assignment of subjects to 
different wage groups. In addition, the Andrews (1967) study also included 
an overcompensated condition, in order to test the differential threshold 
hypothesis that workers are more sensitive to undercompensation than to 
overcompensation. As predicted by the theory, in both studies the under­
paid subjects maintained equity by increasing work quantity at the expense 
of lower quality, while Andrews' overpaid subjects maintained equity by re­
ducing work quantity and increasing work quality. The threshold hypothesis 
was also supported by Andrews to the extent that underpay inequity was found 
to have had a somewhat greater effect than overpay inequity in the case of 
work quantity, but not in the case of work quality. However, in a methodo­
logical study in which an attempt was made to determine perceived ranges of 
equitable payment through psychophysical procedures, Zedeck and Smith (1968) 
offered additional support toward the substantiation of differential thresh­
olds, for they found that their subjects were more willing to indicate in­
equities below rather than above equitable salaries. 
The postulated cognitive modes of inequity reduction, i.e.. Person cog-
nitively distorting either his or Other's inputs and/or outcomes, have not 
received dramatic support by the research, perhaps because most researchers 
have chosen to examine and thus have designed their studies so as to be most 
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conducive to the behavioral modes of reduction. In such studies, with in­
equity already reduced behaviorally, subjects may feel little need for any 
further reduction via cognitive modes. 
Lawler and O'Gara (1967) have found that in comparison with an equitably 
paid group, their piece rate underpaid subjects not only tended to increase 
their productivity, but also reported seeing the task as relatively unimpor­
tant, simple, and unchallenging. The similarly underpaid group of the Lev-
enthal, Allen, Kemelgor and Musten (1967) study, however, did not reduce in­
equity through a distortion of inputs. Though they might have attempted to 
reduce inequity by lowering their perceived inputs, they did just the oppo­
site, and instead judged their inputs to be relatively high. (It should be 
pointed out that this study, as was one other (Leventhal & Bergman, 1968), 
was a variant of the more traditional design in which outcomes are manipu­
lated through the differential assignment of piece rate. The Leventhal 
approach has been to examine how inequitably over- and undercompensated sub­
jects respond to such divisions of compensation and reduce inequity by re­
allocating available rewards. Leventhal et al. (1967) explained their un-
predicted findings by suggesting that their undercompensated subjects may 
have been cognitively exaggerating their perceived inputs in order to make 
their inputs more consistent with their strong desire to increase their 
share of the reward.) Andrews (1967) has reported the general trend in the 
comparison of inequitably overpaid with inequitably underpaid subjects of 
"the higher the piece rate, the more favorable the job attitude on five out 
of six scales" (p. 42). But when his earlier reported data (Andrews, 1965) 
are examined more closely, there is but little apparent difference between 
the equitably paid group and either the inequitably overpaid or inequitably 
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underpaid groups on their ratings of the input dimensions of job importance, 
complexity, and challenge. 
The Andrews (1967) and the Lawler and O'Gara (1967) studies have contri­
buted to the literature in their examination of other variables not specifi­
cally incorporated by Adams into equity theory, yet nevertheless of impor­
tance. For example, Andrews (1967) has shown Person's previous wage experi­
ence to be a significant factor in estimating the effects of manipulating 
piece rate as an outcome. He found differences on quantity of work within 
each "previous high wage per hour" group to be as large as the differences 
between outcome groups, thus emphasizing Adams' position that inputs and out­
comes must be evaluated in terms of the worker's perception of them, rather 
than in terms of objective reality. Lawler and O'Gara (1967) have related 
personality measures obtained from administration of the California Person­
ality Inventory (CPI) to subjects' job attitudes and job performance. They 
found the group of scales on the CPI that were designed to measure sociali­
zation, maturity, and responsibility to show a consistent tendency to be 
positively related to work quality, and somewhat of a tendency to be nega­
tively correlated with productivity. 
Goodman and Friedman (1968) have used a procedure which allows for a 
more precise manipulation of the input variable. They presented input for 
Other in a quantitative fashion and employed this known production rate in 
their induction of the high input/high outcome ratio for Other. By so speci­
fying Other's input, they reported obtaining a reduction in the difference 
in productivity between the inequitably overcompensated (Other = high input/ 
high outcome. Person = low input/high outcome) and their control or "reduced 
inequity" (Other = high input/high outcome. Person = low input/low outcome) 
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groups. One might take this finding to suggest that contrary to the single-
purposed efforts of those studies which would make Adams' general theory of 
social inequity into a theory of wage inequity, the element of pay is still 
but a single element in the ratios of Other and Person, and is not of singu­
lar importance. Weick's (1966) complaint is similar: "Equity research it­
self seems to ignore the idea of the ratio and instead is tied much more 
closely to the specific content of situations" (p. 438). Goodman and Fried­
man (1968) have shown that other elements of the ratios (e.g., input of 
Other) do have their effects. Additionally, they have examined the effect 
of two moderating variables, ability and achievement orientation. However, 
no relationship was found between ability and productivity, and none was 
reported between achievement and either work quantity or work quality. 
Through this entire series of studies there has been posed but one 
experimentally examined alternative explanation which would restrict the 
equity formulation. It would be plausible to interpret the obtained differ­
ences in productivity and work quality when subjects were inequitably over-
compensated as due to the subjects, in such experimental conditions, working 
harder and better so as to insure their continued status in such apparently 
fortuitous and profitable circumstances, i.e., the so-called job insecurity 
explanation. However, the results of two studies (Arrowood, 1961; Adams & 
Jacobsen, 1964) seem to have dismissed this as a viable alternative. Arro­
wood reported data which indicate that those in a condition of high inequity 
produced more, across both "public" and "private" conditions of exposure of 
work results (where public exposure would entail the identification of the 
subject's production rate by the employer), than those in a condition of low 
inequity. But when the data are analyzed by method of exposure, those in 
14 
the public condition are found to have produced more than those in the 
private condition, across levels of inequity. Thus, Adams and Jacobsen 
(1964) later varied three levels of dissonance (inequity) over the condi­
tions of high and low job prospects. It was hypothesized that if effects 
were attributable to job insecurity, a significant interaction effect be­
tween dissonance and job prospects would be obtained, so that the combina­
tion of perceiving oneself as unqualified and also perceiving that future 
employment may be lost would optimally motivate one to improve work quality. 
However, the manipulation of perceived job prospects was reported to not 
have had any significant effects, and instead, the study gave clear support 
only to the original equity formulation. 
A key issue links the concern with equity theory and in general, the 
consistency model, to general psychology. Given that situations of inequity 
can be defined, and effects demonstrated, when does the individual behave so 
as to minimize these? Using the concept of thresholds, under what condi­
tions, if any, is the threshold for inequity so high, for example, and con­
sequently, is the instigation of specifically inequity-reducing behaviors 
so remote a possibility, that the functional value of this approach is lost 
or at the least, very much reduced? In short, when is the model inappro­
priate? For as Pepitone (1966) argues, there are inequities and inequities; 
one could conceive a range from the utterly trivial to the disastrous. 
Therefore, it should be obvious that predictions as to whether or not an 
individual will act and as to how he will act will depend upon the degree 
of significance the inconsistency has for him personally. Without the 
attainment of a satisfactory level of personal relevance, such predictions 
will be hollow. 
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Leventhal et al. (1967) have posed a related restriction pertaining to 
the generality of the theory. They describe Person's tendency to behave in 
accord with equity theory as suggestive of the operation of a norm or behav­
ioral rule which they have referred to as the "equity norm". Like other 
norms, they consider the equity norm to operate more strongly in some situa­
tions than in others. A caution well taken from Leventhal et al. is that 
"Adams' equity model will predict behavior accurately only when Person's 
behavior is being regulated by the equity norm. To the extent that the norm 
is inoperative, as in situations in which Person has adopted an exploitive 
orientation and seeks to maximize his own outcomes at Other's expense, equity 
theory will be unable to make accurate predictions" (p. 3). 
More basic than what Leventhal et al. seem to be identifying as an issue 
of prepotency (i.e., that a latent norm becomes manifestly influential only 
at specific times, and thus has only a relative behavioral significance) are 
the questions of (1) whether an equity norm is in fact learned, and (2) 
whether such learning is a universal phenomenon, although its effects may 
occasionally be latent. Adams has been quite clear in suggesting that prior 
learning does establish the expectations of equity and that it is an inter­
personal process which is involved. In his earlier paper (Adams, 1963a) he 
states that "As was previously suggested, the dissonant relation of an indi­
vidual's inputs and outcomes in comparison to another's is historically and 
culturally determined... Each individual has a different history of learning, 
but to the extent that he learns from people sharing similar values, social 
norms and language, that is, the extent to which he shares the same culture, 
his psychological reactions will be similar to theirs" (p. 425). Similarly, 
he later states (Adams, 1963b) that "When an individual compares himself 
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with another person, he looks at his own inputs and outcomes in relation 
to another person" (p. 9), and concludes (Adams, 1965) that "the expecta­
tions are formed-learned-during the process of socialization, at home, at 
school, at work" (p. 279). Thus it is Adams' position that individuals ex­
perience inconsistencies of various kinds in their lives, and in the process 
learn effective ways of resolving them. 
Brehm and Cohen (1962) have described a study by Day (1961) which may 
be taken as supportive of Adams' learning/socialization position. Day's 
results indicated that a significant number of the young children in his 
sample, which ranged in age from four to six years, responded to an in­
creased reward of M&M candies with an increased effort expenditure on over-
rewarded trials. Within the design of the study, this general finding demon­
strated the attempt to resolve inequity in the overcompensated condition. 
But what is of particular interest in regard to the issue of the role of 
learning and socialization is a further analysis of Day's data according to 
the age of the subjects. When so analyzed, Brehm and Cohen (1962) have re­
ported that it appears that increases or decreases in effort (input) were 
largely a function of age. Whereas the data when uncorrected for age showed 
an increase in effort by 64% of the subjects, against a 36% decrease, when 
the oldest third of the subjects are isolated (children between 5.2 years 
and 6.4 years), 80% of these were found to have increased their inputs 
whereas only 20% decreased them. It should be recognized that these per­
centage data are remarkable neither in their descriptive power nor in their 
connotations. Yet they do seem to suggest, as Brehm and Cohen have concluded, 
that the response to inequity by an increase in effort may be dependent on 
learning associated with socialization, so that only when the person is 
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socially experienced may we predict a strong response in an attempt to 
reduce inequity. 
Adams' theoretical stance appears steadfast in assuming the learning 
of the socially generated norm to be universal. He has stated (Adams, 1965) 
that "the theoretical notions offered are quite as relevant to any social 
situation in which an exchange takes place" (p. 276), and that "In the ab­
sence of this ability, interpersonal relations would be chaotic, if not im­
possible" (p. 279). It is in regard to this point of universality that the 
social comparison basis of the Adams approach has been criticized (Weick, 
1966; Zedeck & Smith, 1968) in its neglect of the possibility that under 
certain conditions a "social isolate" (Weick, 1966) will evaluate his out­
comes as equitable or inequitable in terms of an internal absolute standard 
which is not anchored to a specific reference group or person. One such 
social isolate is the schizophrenic. 
Adams has theoretically obviated the social isolate exception as it 
pertains to his comparative position, by allowing for the case where Other 
may be Person in another job or in another social role. But this appears 
to result in a basic contradiction of terms, for if social inequity is oc­
casionally allowed as an intrapersonal phenomenon, one must occasionally 
speak of intrapersonal social exchange. Thus the social isolate concept is 
an entirely relevant and important challenge to the social underpinnings of 
Adams' theory. In addition, neither the limiting nor the facilitating cir­
cumstances of the choice of Other as another individual versus as historical 
Person have been described. This would seem to necessitate an examination 
of the obviated. 
A study by Gill (1963) may be taken as a representative experimental 
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illustration of the general clinical observation that the schizophrenic 
process involves a withdrawal from normal social interaction. (See, for 
example, Arieti, 1968; Bateson, Jackson, Haley & Weakland, 1956; Feni-
chel, 1945; Noyes, 1948; Rosen, 1953; Shulman, 1968; Sullivan, 1947, 
1953; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967.) To briefly summarize Gill's 
findings, schizophrenic subjects manifested a low degree of conformity be­
havior and a sparsity of affectual relationships in their reactions to the 
group when comparing length of lines in an optical illusion study. Gill, 
therefore, concluded that schizophrenics are less highly motivated to main­
tain group membership and thus have less of a need to conform to group 
influence. 
Scheff (1963) has submitted a pertinent framework wherein a theory of 
mental disorder is generated under the assumption that psychiatric symptoms 
are violations of social norms. He holds that there are innumerable norms 
over which social consensus is so complete that the members of a group ap­
pear to take them for granted. For example, a person engaged in conversa­
tion is expected to face towards his partner, rather than directly away 
from him, or is expected to stand at a proper conversational distance, nei­
ther one inch away nor across the room, and so on. A person who regularly 
violates these expectations is considered to violate the assumptive world 
of the group, "the world that is construed to be the only one that is nat­
ural, decent, and possible" (p. 439). The typical norm governing decency 
or reality, therefore, literally "goes without saying" and its violation 
is unthinkable for most of its normal members. 
Validation studies of the equity norm (Adams, 1963a, 1963b; Adams & 
Jacobsen, 1964; Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; Andrews, 1967; Arrowood, 1961; 
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Friedman & Goodman, 1967; Goodman & Friedman, 1968; Lawler & O'Gara, 1967; 
Leventhal et al., 1967; Leventhal & Bergman, 1968) appear rather seriously 
circumscribed in the restriction of their experimental samples to a college 
population. Such a restriction seems only questionably appropriate in light 
of the extent to which Adams' theory rests upon an assumptive foundation en­
tailing processes of learning and socialization. Though perhaps operation­
ally convenient, this restriction limits the theory's descriptive power and 
weakens any heuristic purpose. Admittedly, to demonstrate that the validity 
of a theory may be limited under special criteria of sample selection, e.g., 
"chronic schizophrenics," may often reduce to no more than an exercise in 
the esoteric. However, Adams' theory has been supported by such commanding 
and consistent research findings that one would be derelict not to subject 
the basic model to more varied circumstances. This is particularly the case 
insofar as the social comparison model is suggestive of prevalent conceptual­
izations, and hints at an underlying rationale for the treatment of schizo­
phrenia. For example, if Adams' theory of social equity could be demonstra­
ted as predictive of the behavior of a population of chronic outpatient 
schizophrenics, the challenge this would offer to their traditional charac­
teristics of autism, withdrawal, and even to their very chronicity itself, 
would be apparent. 
Clinical views of the schizophrenic reaction would seem to anticipate 
the use of an idiographic or non-social model in the identification and re­
duction of inequity in such a population. Using Adams' terms, the schizo­
phrenic as Person would be predicted to attend only to Person's ratio of in­
puts and outcomes, with minimal reference to Other's ratio. Equity would be 
achieved by the individual balancing his net inputs against his net outcomes. 
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according to the principle: "I should get what I deserve, and I don't care 
about the Other." In this more idiographic schema, perceived overcompensa­
tion would be the result of the subjective value of his net inputs being 
less than the subjective value of his net outcomes, whereas perceived under­
compensation would be the result of the inputs' value being greater than 
the outcomes' value. 
In order that this idiographic model be examined, while at the same 
time giving full play to the social model, there is a need for an alteration 
in the standard induction. In the typical instructions, a balanced Other is 
induced along with an unbalanced Person, so that equity is already estab­
lished in an individual fashion for Other, resulting in a confounding of the 
two models. 
The design of each of two other previously described studies (Adams & 
Jacobsen, 1964; Goodman & Friedman, 1968) appear similarly confounded. 
They have identified as a "reduced dissonance" condition under a social mod­
el an induction of Other = high input/high outcome. Person = low input/low 
outcome. However, this may be described under an idiographic model as a 
control condition of no dissonance where Person is already equitably bal­
anced, having low inputs and low outcomes. In a recent review of the liter­
ature intended as a contrast and comparison between Adams' equity theory and 
general expectancy theory, Lawler (1968) too has made no distinction between 
the social versus the idiographic models. He summarily characterized the 
general approach of expectancy theory as one which "can be said to emphasize 
persons trying to maximize their positive outcomes" (p. 598), as distinct 
from an undifferentiated yet idiographic-sounding version of equity theory 
which "emphasizes persons trying to balance their inputs against their 
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outcomes" (p. 598), omitting reference to the very core of Adams' position, 
i.e., its social basis. 
An additional consideration warrants the establishment of Other and 
Person ratios in which the levels of the input and outcome factors are more 
fully varied. In his earlier paper Adams (1963a) assumed, with regard to 
the amount of inequity that exists under given ratios, that greater inequity 
would result when both inputs and outcomes are discrepant than when only 
inputs or outcomes are discrepant. However, to date there have been no 
studies which have attempted to induce such conditions. 
A further problem with the studies done so far has to do with the nature 
of the tasks on which the subjects have worked. Interviewing (Adams, 1963a, 
1963b; Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; Andrews, 1967; Arrowood, 1961; Friedman 
& Goodman, 1967), checking errors on galley sheets (Adams & Jacobsen, 1964), 
questionnaire scoring (Goodman & Friedman, 1968), data checking (Andrews, 
1967), and doing multiplication problems (Leventhal et al., 1967; Leventhal 
& Bergman, 1968) comprise all the tasks that have been used. In all of 
these tasks productivity and quality have been shown to be negatively corre­
lated, making it difficult to test some of the predictions of the theory. 
For example, in the interviewing task, it is highly doubtful whether produc­
tivity as number of interviews collected in a two hour period can be meaning­
fully interpreted apart from quality of work as number of words per inter­
view. What is needed is a task where, as Lawler (1968) suggests, quantity 
and quality are free to vary as a function of the subject's effort and where 
they are uncorrelated, or at the least, where the intrinsic requirements of 
the task negate significant variance of either the one or the other dependent 
variable. Furthermore, that one study (Andrews, 1967) which did recognize 
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the possibility of task differences and accordingly employed two tasks, i.e., 
data checking as a "dull" task and interviewing as an "interesting" task, 
purposely adjusted the two for an average production rate of nine pieces per 
hour, and thus effectively allowed for no measure of task variance. 
In a study (Lawler, Koplin, Young & Fadem, 1968) which did not restrict 
its sample solely to a college population (but included 31 local residents 
as well as nine college students), the significant effects of an oveirpayment 
induction on productivity and work quality were found to dissipate to non-
significance in the second and third of three consecutive experimental ses­
sions. Of note in the Lawler et al. (1968) study is that they obtained a 
significant interaction (F=15.79; p<.01) between treatment and sessions in 
addition to a significant main effect (F=15.19; p<.01) due to sessions 
alone. These data seem to raise the important question of whether inequity 
effects are actually due to the manipulated variables, or whether a covariate 
is involved. 
The Lawler et al. (1968) study has shown that effects may not always be 
sustained through succeeding experimental periods, but are obtained only in 
the initial introduction of the subjects to the task, i.e., when the subjects 
have no personal expectations of appropriate or suitable task performance. 
This suggests that after a period of exposure to the task, such "practice" 
would allow for the formation of personal expectations of appropriate be­
havior which may be altogether distinct from those implied.expectations 
which the experimenter provides in the induction. Thus the manipulation may 
merely provide the subject with short-term normative expectations of appro­
priate task performance, expectations which may be replaced by others which 
are formed during a period of experience with the task. Personal norms may 
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then be developed, become prepotent, and diminish "treatment" effects. In 
short, this interpretation of the Lawler et al. (1968) study points to the 
necessity of estimating task practice effects. 
Purpose 
It was the purpose of this study to examine the resolution of inequity 
by a population which exemplifies the social isolate. It was hypothesized 
that such a population would utilize an idiographic, non-social model in 
the identification and reduction of inequity by demonstrating minimal ref­
erence to the input/outcome ratio of Other. 
Also intended was an examination of other issues which have been raised 
by the previous research. Specifically, this study attempted to: 
(1) Evaluate the differential strength, if any, in the effects of the input 
and the outcome variables of Other and Person; 
(2) Evaluate the differential effects of under- and overcompensation; 
(3) Estimate task variance; 
(4) Estimate the effect of practice as it might function as a covariate. 
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METHOD 
Sample and Setting 
The subjects employed in this study were 56 members of the Day Treat­
ment Center, Veterans Administration Center, Des Moines, Iowa. The Day 
Treatment Center (DTC) is an outpatient facility of the Veterans Adminis­
tration which provides services for a psychiatric population. The goals 
of these services are: (1) forestalling hospitalization, (2) improving 
clinical status, and (3) facilitating community adjustment. These goals 
may be represented by the bipolar dimension of "hospitalization-employ-
ment". 
The following criteria determined sample selection; (1) outpatients 
receiving psychiatric treatment, (2) with a current, singular psychiatric 
diagnosis of "schizophrenic reaction", unspecified type, (3) a history of 
inpatient psychiatric hospitalization, (4) currently unemployed, and (5) 
male. The mean age of the sample at the time of the study was 42.76 years 
(0=8.68 years), ranging from 28 to 63 years, with a median value of 43.5. 
Since therapeutic goals were often antithetical to continuous or reg­
ular attendance at the DTC, no descriptive data were available with regard 
to the subjects* length of outpatient status. The total years of inpatient 
hospitalization which had been amassed by the sample as a group (415.75 
years) had as its mean value 7.42 years (0=6.56 years), and ranged from 0.08 
to 24.33 years. Individual subject's total years of hospitalization were 
not always accumulated within one continuous period, but ranged from a sin­
gle admission to 22 separate admissions. The sample as a whole had been 
hospitalized for 17.3% of its mean life, with individual subject's 
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percentages ranging from 0.3% to 52%. Though most subjects had once engaged 
in gainful employment, more recent employment histories were typically spora­
dic, and all subjects were unemployed at the time of the study. 
The study was conducted within the DTC and was synchronized into the 
customary pattern of on-going DTC activities. This was enhanced by the 
previously established role of the experimenter as "Counseling Psychologist", 
that member of the DTC staff most responsible for jobs and work-related ac­
tivities. Experimental sessions were held within the DTC building, in a 
room which had been designated as a "special project" area prior to the 
study. Thus the setting was presumed to have allowed for a realistic work 
simulation. 
Design 
The study was conducted as a 2X2X2 factorial experiment with equal rep­
lications. Factor A was the input/outcome ratio of Other, and was at one 
of two fixed levels, i.e., high input/low outcome, low input/high outcome 
(i=l,2). Factor B was Person's input (high-low, j=l,2), and Factor C was 
Person's outcome (high-low, k=l,2). The total sample of 56 subjects (D) was 
randomly divided into the eight treatment conditions (Table 1) so that there 
were seven observations per cell (m=l to 7). Thus the model followed was; 
?ljkm - + Sj + + BCjk + ABC^  ^+ MCD^ /y^ (Error) 
The total error term in the model was defined as "subjects within treatments". 
This mixed model was used to describe performance on each of two separate 
tasks. The sources of variance, degrees of freedom (df), and expected mean 
squares (EMS) for each source are presented in Table 2. From Table 2 it can 
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Table 1. Treatment conditions showing Other and Person ratios with type of 
compensation by social or idiographic definition 


























Input low Input low 
Outcome , . , Outcome , . , high high 
equitable over 
Input low Input high 















Table 2. Sources of variance, degrees of freedom, and expected mean squares 
Source df EMS 
Other's ratio (A) i-1 + jkm6^  ^
Person 
Outcome (C) k-1 ±^ 0 J + ijmS^  ^
A X B  ( i - l ) ( j - l )  ^ a b d ^  ^ ® a b ^  
A X C (i-1)(k-1) 
B X C  ( j - l ) ( k - l )  l O b c d ^  +  
A X B X C  (i-1) 0-1) (k-1) "dMb/+ "«ab/ 
Error (Total) (m-l)ijk d^/abc^  
D m-1 ijka^  ^
A X D (i-1)(m-1) jko^ ^^  
B X D (j-l)(m-l) iko^ ^^  
C X D (k-1)(m-1) 
A X B X D (i-l)(j-l)(m-l) 
A X C X Û (i-1)(k-1)(m-1) j^ acd^  
B X C X D  ( j - l ) ( k - l ) ( m - l )  ^ ^ b c d ^  
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be seen that the appropriate error term for a test of a given effect is the 
mean square whose expectation contains all of the components that are in 
the EMS for the given effect except the component directly attributable to 
the given effect. 
Tasks 
In order to estimate task variance, it was necessary to devise two 
tasks which were distinct from each other yet not so unrelated that they 
would appear contrived. In addition, it was essential that quantity in per­
formance be separated from quality of performance, and that the intrinsic 
requirements of the tasks be relatively simple so that performance might 
vary only as a function of the effort of the subject. For these reasons 
two new tasks were developed for this study. 
A series of standard data cards was generated with entries punched 
and printed in columns 1-21. The first column contained the number 1, 2, 
or 3 in random order throughout the deck of 9999 cards. The cards were num­
bered consecutively (0001-9999) in columns 17-20 for purposes of identifica­
tion, but such identification was presumed masked by the random entries in 
columns 2-16 and column 21. The origin of the cards was apparent, for the 
words "Iowa State University Computation Center" and the University seal 
were printed on each. The deck of data cards was re-used several times, 
after being re-ordered to the original sequence. 
Task #1; sorting 
The first task required the subject to sort these data cards into three 
groups, according to the number (1, 2, or 3) in the first column. Cards 
were sorted onto the work table which had been partitioned by masking tape 
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into three sections. A number of previously sorted cards were left stacked 
in each of the partitions, so as to simulate the "project's" on-going nature. 
In a qualitative sense, there were few opportunities for variance. The sub­
ject was simply required to sort the card onto its respective section of the 
table (1, 2, or 3 from left to right). While there was no restriction on 
the precision or lack thereof of card placement, most subjects were rela­
tively neat in their work, and created their own separate piles of cards. 
Several factors dictated the selection of a rather short (five minute) 
work period. The attention span of most subjects was considered unreliable. 
In addition, the simplicity of the task did allow for a fairly high number 
of units to be produced per minute. Thus it was felt that a relatively 
short work period could be tolerated both by the subjects and by the psycho­
metric considerations. The dependent variable for the first task, then, was 
the number of data cards correctly sorted during a five minute period. 
Task #2: assembling 
The second task required the subject to assemble the data cards into 
groups of three. Taking one card from each of the sorted categories, the 
resultant packets were to consist of a "one", a "two", and a "three", in 
that order, and were to be fastened together with a paper clip at the bottom 
edge of the cards. The packet was then placed in a data card box which was 
inclined forward to allow the packets to easily stand on edge. A number of 
completed packets had been arranged in the box, but were separated from 
those produced by the subject by fastening the former with an elastic band. 
The dependent variable for this second task was the number of packets assem­
bled during a five minute period. 
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Independent Variables 
An attempt was made to mirror several select elements of the input and 
outcome factors in the ratios of Other and Person which have been especially 
emphasized in the theoretical statements of Adams. Though these elements 
have been used in some previous research, they typically have been presented 
by implication or have been manipulated in isolation from the others. 
Input 
The presentation of input in a quantitative fashion, i.e., by providing . 
known production rates, has been shown to result in a lowering of experi­
mental effect when such quantitative presentation is confined to Other's in­
put (Goodman & Friedman, 1968). However, it would appear plausible that such 
a presentation, when also provided for Person, would result in a clear, con­
cise expectation of performance and would provide an unambiguous basis for 
Other-Person comparisons. 
Under this rationale, a pilot study (n=ll) was conducted for the pur­
pose of determining "norm" performance on each of the two tasks, so as to 
establish the levels of a quantitative statement of input. The instructions 
which were given to this group followed exactly those which were later used 
during the experimental sessions (and which are presented in the Procedure 
section), but with the experimental manipulations omitted. Mean performance 
on Task //I was 101.73, 0=33.55. Therefore, plus and minus two standard dev­
iations were identified as convenient high and low levels of the quantified 
element of input, with high=170 and low=35 cards sorted in five minutes. 
Mean performance on Task #2 was 16.82, 0=4.02. The high and low levels of 
the second task, therefore, were respectively identified as 25 and 9 packets 
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assembled in five minutes. 
Input was not only specified by this dimension of difficulty (number 
of pieces to be completed), but also by the dimensions of ability and ex­
perience. The levels of the input factor (Task #1) for Other were the 
following : 
High - "I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. 
Paul Day Centers usually are able to sort 170 of these 
in five minutes. They seem to have more than enough 
ability and experience, even though one has to have a 
real talent for paper work to do it that well." 
Low - "I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. 
Paul Day Centers usually are able to sort 35 of these 
in five minutes. They don't seem to have enough abil­
ity and experience, but they say that one doesn't have 
to be good with paper work to do it that well." 
The levels of the input factor (Task #1) for Person were the following: 
High - "Now in your case, you could be able to sort 170 of 
these in five minutes. You seem to have more than 
enough ability and experience, even though you have 
to have a real talent for paper work to do it that 
well." 
Low - "Now in your case, you could be able to sort 35 of 
these in five minutes. You don't seem to have enough 
ability and experience, but you don't have to be good 
with paper work to do it that well." 
The levels of the input factor (Task #2) for Other were the following: 
High - "I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. 
Paul Day Centers usually are able to assemble 25 pack­
ets in five minutes. They seem to have more than 
enough ability and experience, even though one has to 
have a real talent for paper work to do it that well." 
Low - "I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. 
Paul Day Centers usually are able to assemble 9 pack­
ets in five minutes. They don't seem to have enough 
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ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't 
have to be good with paper work to do it that well." 
The levels of the input factor (Task #2) for Person were the following: 
High - "Now in your case, you could be able to assemble 25 
packets in five minutes. You seem to have more than 
enough ability and experience, even though you have 
to have a real talent for paper work to do it that 
well." 
Low - "Now in your case, you could be able to assemble 9 
packets in five minutes. You don't seem to have 
enough ability and experience, but one doesn't have 
to be good with paper work to do it that well." 
Outcome 
The manipulation of outcomes in this study was not typical of the prev­
ious research, for outcomes were not specified as wages. Rather, outcomes 
in the present study attempted to reflect what Adams has implied as two im­
portant general dimensions, i.e., immediate rewards intrinsic to the task 
(specified as interest), and the value associated with more long-term bene­
fits (experience leading to future gainful employment). 
The levels of the outcome factor were identical for each of the two 
tasks. The levels for Other were the following: 
High - "The members of those Day Centers found work like 
this extremely valuable to them. In addition to 
finding it to be a clean and interesting kind of 
job, the experience they got with this job helped 
some of those men in getting some very high paying 
office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas." 
Low - "The members of those Day Centers did not find work 
like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get 
interested in this kind of job, and there didn't 
seem to be much of a salary in this kind of work in 
the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas." 
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The levels of the outcome factor (Task #1 and Task #2) for Person were the 
following: 
High - "You probably will find work like this extremely 
valuable to you. It's a clean and interesting 
kind of job, and the experience you'll get with 
this job should certainly help you in getting a 
very high paying office job in the Des Moines 
area." 
Low - "You probably won't find work like this valuable 
to you. It's not a very interesting kind of job, 
and there just isn't much of a salary in this kind 
of work in the Des Moines area." 
Other 
The study attempted to make the social basis of Adams' model more expli­
cit by identifying Other as a group of comparable patients in different geo­
graphic locations, i.e., "members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers". 
2 All possible (2 ) input/outcome combinations for the ratio of Other were not 
utilized in this study. Instead, the high input/low outcome and low input/ 
high outcome ratios comprised the two levels of the A factor, i.e., ratio of 
Other. These specific ratios were selected so as to create conditions of 
maximum inequity between the ratios of Other and Person. This was done fol­
lowing Adams' assumption that the greater the inequity of the input/outcome 
balance, the greater will be the resulting dissonance and the greater will 
be the motivation for corrective acts. 
Procedure 
Seven subjects were randomly assigned to each of the eight treatment 
groups shown in Table 1. These 56 subjects were distinct from those used 
in the pilot study. Individual subjects were approached in the Day Room of 
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the DTC and advised that their help in a project was needed. The experi­
mental sessions were introduced by the following narrative: 
"The VA and Iowa State University are involved in a 
project to study hospital planning and administration. 
Part of the VA's responsibility is to sort and assemble 
the data so that it can be analyzed by computer. The 
data have been punched and printed on these IBM cards." 
The nature of the first of the two tasks was then described: 
"In order for this project to be possible here at the 
Des Moines Day Center, we first have to see how many of 
these cards can be sorted into three different piles, 
according to the number in the left-hand corner, like 
this..." 
The experimenter then demonstrated the task by sorting at least six of the 
cards which had been positioned immediately in front of the worker. He then 
observed the subject sort a minimum of six cards. As soon as the subject 
was performing the task to criterion, the experimenter directed him to: 
"Continue to sort these for five minutes. I have to 
check on something outside, but I'll be back in a 
short time." 
The experimenter then noted the serial number of the top card of the subject's 
work pile, started his concealed stop watch, and left the subject alone in 
the work area. When he returned in five minutes, he took the unsorted cards 
from the subject and recorded the serial number of the last card which had 
been sorted. This ended the practice session for Task //I. 
The experimenter then began the induction for the first task with; 
"Since we started this project I've found out some 
more information about this job." 
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The appropriate levels of the variables were then given by the experimenter 
in the following order: (1) input and outcome of Other, (2) in^ t of 
Person, and (3) outcome of Person. The specific inductions for the eight 
conditions are given verbatim in Appendix A. The subject was then told: 
"Now sort these for five minutes. I'll be back then." 
The experimenter started his stop watch and left the subject alone in the 
work room. He returned in five minutes, took the remaining unsorted cards 
from the subject, and recorded the serial number of the last card which had 
been sorted. This ended the experimental session for Task #1. 
Task #2 was then introduced: 
"Fine. Now the last step is to assemble these cards 
that have already been sorted into groups of three, 
so that each packet has a "one", a "two", and a "three" 
in it, in order, with each packet fastened by a paper 
clip at the bottom, and then put into this box, like 
this..." 
The experimenter then demonstrated the task by assembling one packet. He 
observed the subject assemble at least two packets. The experimenter then 
directed the subject to: 
"Continue to assemble them for five minutes. I have 
to check on something outside, but I'll be back in a 
short time." 
The experimenter once again started his concealed stop watch, left the sub­
ject alone in the work room, and returned in five minutes. He marked the 
assembled packets (minus the practice packets) with a rubber band, ending 
the practice session for Task #2. 
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The experimenter then began the induction for the second task with: 
"Let me tell you something about this part of the job." 
The manipulations were then given for Task #2, after which the subject was 
told: 
"Now assemble these for five minutes. I'll be back 
then." 
Leaving the subject alone for five minutes, the experimenter returned, end­
ing the experimental session for Task #2. 
Before releasing the subject, a post-work questionnaire was administered 
to each subject, following this introduction: 
"Since this project is being done at the Day Center, 
I want to find out what the members think about this 
kind of work. These questions will help me find that 
out. I would like to read them to you, and then you 
answer them the best you can." 
This questionnaire (a copy of which is included in Appendix B) was intended 
as a crude estimate of the resolution of inequity by cognitive means after 
having allowed for behavioral resolutions. The subjects were asked to judge 
each of the major elements of the inputs and outcomes for Other and Person 
on a scale from one to five (high to low). These judgements were of: (1) 
Other's input when specified as difficulty, (2) Person's input when speci­
fied as difficulty, (3) Other's input when specified as ability, (4) Per­
son's input when specified as ability, (5) Other's outcome when specified 
as value, (6) Person's outcome when specified as value, (7) Other's out­
come when specified as interest, (8) Person's outcome when specified as 
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interest, (9) how much they liked the job, and (10) their estimate of a 
fair hourly salary for this kind of work. 
The subjects were thanked for their assistance and released with no 
mention of their maintaining confidentiality. The possible effects of such 
an admonition were considered detrimental to the goals of the simulation as 
an "on-going project". It was the later consensus of the DTC staff that 
there were few if any identifiable consequences resulting from participa­
tion in the study. 
Statistical Analysis 
The main effects and interactions of the input and outcome variables 
of Other and Person were examined by analysis of variance. In this anal­
ysis, the idiographic model was represented by the interaction of Person's 
input with Person's outcome (B X C), whereas the social model was repre­
sented by the interaction of Other's ratio with Person's input and outcome 
(A X B X C). 
Differential effects of under- and overcompensation were evaluated 
through t tests in which treatments were grouped by level of compensation 
according to each of the two models. Both the behavioral and the rating 
data were so analyzed. Task variance was estimated through separate anal­
yses for each of the two tasks, and various regression analyses were con­
ducted in order to estimate the effects of practice. 
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RESULTS 
Summary tables for the analyses of variance for the treatment groups 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4, showing the main effects, interactions, 
and error terms,for the experimental data for Task #1 and Task #2. As 
indicated in the summary tables, the treatment effects were not statisti­
cally significant (df = 1/6, F = 5.05, p<.05; df = 1/48, F = 4.04, p<.05). 
Table 3. Summary table for analysis of variance for treatment groups on 
experimental data for Task #1 
Source SS df MS F 
Other's ratio (A) 1650.29 1 1650.29 0.90 
Person 714.29 1 714.29 0.23 
Outcome Parson 1360.29 1 1360.29 0.77 
A X B 171.49 1 171.49 0.06 
A X C 1805.78 1 1805.78 0.85 
B X C 37.78 1 37.78 0.01 
A X B X C 3648.29 1 3648.29 1.76 
A X D 11009.71 6 1834.95 
B X D 18290.21 6 3048.37 
C X D 10625.71 6 1770.95 
A X B X D 16113.01 6 2685.50 
A X C X D 12679.22 6 2113.20 
B X C X D 20288.22 6 3381.37 
Total Error 99704.29 48 2077.17 
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Table 4. Summary table for analysis of variance for treatment groups on 
experimental data for Task #2 
Source SS df MS F 
Other's ratio (A) 103.14 1 103.14 1.41 
Person 4.57 1 4.57 0,12 
Outcome Person 92.57 1 92.57 1.67 
A X B 138.72 1 138.72 2.21 
A X C 4.57 1 4.57 0.14 
B X C 14.00 1 14.00 0.20 
A X B X C 151.14 1 151.14 3.13 
A X D 438.11 6 73.02 
B X D 236.18 6 39.36 
C X D 331.68 6 55.28 
A X B X D 376.46 6 62.74 
A X C X D 196.68 6 32.78 
B X C X D 429.75 6 71.62 
Total Error 2315.48 48 48.23 
Comparisons of the differences between the mean productivity of those 
treatment groups which classified (cf., Table 1) as overcompensated, equi­
tably compensated, or undercompensated by a social definition of inequity 
are presented as t tests in Tables 5, 7, and 9. Since the general princi­
ple of equity theory predicts that when overcompensated, Person will increase 
his input, whereas when undercompensated he will decrease his input, the t 
tests of these data are one-tailed (where negative values indicate 
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differences in the unpredicted direction). While such repeated t tests lack 
the power of an analysis of variance procedure, they were performed in order 
to provide an analysis common to much of the previous research literature. 
These same comparisons of mean productivity are given in Tables 6, 8, 
and 10 when the grouping of conditions followed an idiographic definition of 
inequity. These various comparisons indicated that there were no signifi­
cant differences between the productivity scores of the overcompensated and 
the equitably compensated groups under both the social and the idiographic 
models of inequity (Tables 5 and 6). Likewise, there were no significant 
differences between the mean productivity scores of the undercompensated 
and the equitably compensated groups under each of the models (Tables 7 and 
8). Nor were there significant differences between the productivity scores 
of the overcompensated group when compared with the undercompensated group 
(Tables 9 and 10). Overall, neither the social nor the idiographic model of 
inequity allowed comparisons which demonstrated significant differences be­
tween treatments on the behavioral data. There was no variance across tasks. 
Table 5. Treatment differences (means) in productivity under a social 
model of over- and equitable compensation 
Task Overcompensation Equitable godgi t 
(n=21) (n=l4) 
Sorting 129.00 109.00 1.40 
Assembling 23.24 19.71 1.46 
41 
Table 6. Treatment differences (means) in productivity under an idiographic 
model of over- and equitable compensation 
Task Overcompensation Equitable t 
(n=14) (n=28) 
Sorting 119.71 125.18 -0.38 
Assembling 20.57 22.36 -0.74 
Table 7. Treatment differences (means) in productivity under a social 
model of under- and equitable compensation 
Task Undercompensation gonial Equitable t 
(n=21) (n=14) 
Sorting 119.00 109.00 0.54 
Assembling 19.81 19.71 0.07 
Table 8. Treatment differences (means) in productivity under an idiographic 
model of under- and equitable compensation 
Task Undercompensation Equitable 
(n=l4) (n=28) 
Sorting 110.93 125.18 -0.94 
Assembling 19.00 22.36 -1.30 
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Table 9. Treatment differences (means) in productivity under a social 
model of over- and undercompensation 
Task Overcompensation^ ^^ .^ Undercompensation^ ^^ ^^  ^ t 
(n=21) (n=21) 
Sorting 129.00 119.00 0.59 
Assembling 23.24 19.81 1.50 
Table 10. Treatment differences (means) in productivity under an idiographic 
model of over- and undercompensation 
Task Overcompensation^ ^^ Q Undercompensation^ ^^  ^ t 
(n=14) (n=14) 
Sorting 119.71 110.93 0.52 
Assembling 20.57 19.00 0.80 
Comparisons of the differences between the judgements of the various 
input and outcome elements by the overcompensated, equitably compensated, 
or undercompensated groups under the social model of inequity are contained 
in Tables 11, 13, and 15. These same comparisons of mean ratings, made with 
treatment groups arranged according to the idiographic model, are presented 
in Tables 12, 14, and 16. While statistical significance was achieved in sev­
eral of these numerous comparisons, most were in the unpredicted direction, 
and therefore were uninterpretable by either definition of inequity. 
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Table 11. Treatment differences (means) in ratings of components of input 
and outcome variables for Other and Person under a social model 
of over- and equitable compensation 
Attitude Scale 
(high-low, 1-5) 





Input - difficulty 3.09 2.71 0.95 
Person" difficulty 3.33 3.43 0.27 
Input Other " 2.33 2.07 0.75 
Person-
3.28 3.50 0.76 
Outcome - value Other 3.14 2.00 -3.14** 
Outcome „ - value 
Person 
3.86 2.86 2.04 
Outcome - interest 
Other 3.33 3.00 -0.74 
Outcome „ - interest Person 3.48 3.21 0.54 
**p<.01 
Table 12. Treatment differences (means) in ratings of components of input 
and outcome variables for Other and Person under an ideographic 








Input " difficulty 3.07 3.50 -1.10 
Person" difficulty 3.50 3.64 0.42 
Other - 2.14 2.75 -1.69* 
Person" *biliCy 3.50 3.00 -1.48 
Outcome - value 
Other 2.43 2.71 
0.66 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
Attitude Scale Overcompensation . ,. Equitable .,. 
(hlgh-l„„. 1-5) 
Outcome „ - value 3.07 3.61 -1.10 
Person 
Outcome - interest 2.93 3.43 1.22 Other 
Outcome _ - interest 2.92 3.46 -1.24 
Person 
*p<.05 
Table 13. Treatment differences (means) in ratings of components of input 
and outcome variables for Other and Person under a social model 
of under- and equitable compensation 
Attitude Scale 
(high-low, 1-5) 





Input - difficulty 3.67 2.71 -2.77** 
Person" difficulty 3.81 3.43 0.46 
Other • 2.95 2.07 -2.56** 
Person" *blliCy 2.81 3.50 -0.70 
Outcome - value Other 2.52 2.00 
1.38 
Outcome _ - value 
Person 
3.28 2.86 -0.84 
Outcome - interest 3.52 3.00 1.46 
Outcome „ - interest Person 3.33 3.21 -0.31 
**p<.01 
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Table 14. Treatment differences (means) in ratings of components of input 
and outcome variables for Other and Person under an idiographic 
model of under- and equitable compensation 
Attitude Scale 
(high-low, 1-5) 





Input Q^ her ~ difficulty 2.78 3.50 1.92* 
Input Person" difficulty 3.43 3.64 -0.22 
Input Other " 2.35 2.75 1.16 
Input Person" ability 3.21 3.00 0.66 
Outcome - value Other 2.64 2.71 -0.02 
Outcome _ - value 
Person 
3.28 3.61 0.86 
Outcome - interest Other 3.50 3.43, 
0.02 
Outcome _ - interest 3.57 3.46 -0.03 Person 
*p<.05 
Table 15. Treatment differences (means) in ratings of components of input 
and outcome variables for Other and Person under a social model 
of over- and undercompensation 
Attitude Scale 
(high-low, 1-5) 
Overcompensation^ ^^  
(n=21) 
Undercompensation^ ^^  
(n=21) 
t 
Input - difficulty 3.09 3.67 -1.66 
Person" difficulty 3.33 3.81 0.51 
Other - ability 2.33 2.95 -1.94* 
Person" *blliCy 3.28 2.81 -1.57 
Outcome - value 
Other 3.14 2.52 
-1.68* 
Table 15 (Continued) 
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Attitude Scale Overcompensation Undercompensation t 
(high-low. 1-5) (..21) 
Outcome „ - value 3.86 Person 
Outcome - interest 3.33 3.52 Other 






Table 16. Treatment differences (means) in ratings of components of input 
and outcome variables for Other and Person under an idiographic 
model of over- and undercompensation 
Attitude Scale Overcompensation.,. Undercompensation.,. t 
(high-low, 1-5) (..!,) (..14) 
Input - difficulty 3.07 2.78 0.78 
Input pergon" difficulty 3.50 3.43 -0.17 
Input ~ ability 2.14 2.36 -0.59 
Input ability 3.50 3.21 -1.04 
Outcome - value 2.43 2.64 0.54 Other 
Outcome _ - value 3.07 3.28 -0.39 
Person 
Outcome - interest 2.93 3.50 1.46 
Other 
Outcome „ - interest 2.92 3.57 -1.48 
Person 
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However, Table 14 did contain one theoretically describable "significant" 
difference. Those subjects classified as undercompensated by an idiographic 
definition rated the input of Other, when input was specified as degree of 
difficulty, as significantly higher (mean = 2,78) than did those subjects 
which were idiographically defined as equitably compensated (mean = 3.50). 
Yet the idiographic model, by definition, precludes Person's consideration 
of the ratio of Other in establishing his own personal level of equity. 
Thus this difference too must be described as without meaning, and presum­
ably is a statistical artifact. 
The data obtained for the practice session of Task #2 were examined in 
an analysis of variance for treatment effects. The rationale for this anal­
ysis was the conjecture that with the sequential ordering of experimental 
and practice sessions, the experimental effects for Task #1 might not appear 
until the practice session for Task #2. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 17. 
As seen in Table 17, a statistically significant A X B X C interaction 
was obtained, as predicted by the social model of inequity, but during a 
session which contained no manipulations. Such an effect might be interpre­
ted as a carry over from Task #1 treatment effects, but it was demonstrated 
in Table 3 that there were no treatment effects in the experimental session 
for Task #1. Though an interpretation based on a delay in effects was ten­
able, the role of practice invited further evaluation through regression 
analysis procedures. 
The variables for regression were the following: 
1: practice session. Task #1 
2: experimental session, Task #1 
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Table 17. Summary table for analysis of variance for treatment groups 
on practice data for Task #2 
Source SS df MS F 
Other's ratio (A) 1.79 1 1.79 0.04 
Person 
0.64 1 0.64 0.02 
Outcome Person 185.79 1 185.79 4.89 
A X B 108.64 1 108.64 2.54 
A X C 0.06 1 0.06 0.00 
B X C 20.64 1 20.64 0.65 
A X B X C 144.66 1 144.66 4.28* 
A X D 286.46 6 47.74 
B X D 223.11 6 37.18 
C X D 227.96 6 37.99 
A X B X D 256.11 6 42.68 
A X C X D 256.69 6 42.78 
B X C X D 190.61 6 31.77 
Total Error 1623.71 48 33.83 
*p<.05 
3: practice session, Task #2 
4: experimental session. Task #2 
5-11: treatment groups 
12; "percentage hospitalization". 
The regressions which were performed, their multiple R-square values, and 
the associated F-ratios are presented in Table 18. Due to the high inter-
correlation of performance scores in each of the practice and experimental 
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sessions, only the immediately preceding practice session was examined as a 
covariate of the experimental sessions. A matrix of these intercorrelations 
is presented in Table 19. 
Table 18. Regressions of experimental data on treatment groups and the 
covariates of practice and hospitalization 
Regression Instruction Multiple R-square F 
2 on 5-11 
4 on 5-11 
2 on 1 
4 on 3 
2 on 1, 5-11 
4 on 3, 5-11 
2 on 12 


















Table 19. Intercorrelation of performance scores in practice and 
experimental sessions 
Performance Session D 
Practice, Task #1 (A) 
Experimental, Task #1 (B) 
Practice, Task #2 (C) 
Experimental, Task #2 (D) 
( ) .749 .677 .664 
( ) .594 ' .689 
( ) .829 
( ) 
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The regression of the experimental data for Task #1 on the treatment 
groups presented findings analogous to those which were indicated in Table 
3. The multiple R-square value for this regression showed that only 8.6% 
of the variance in this session was accounted for by treatments. Similarly, 
the multiple R-square value of 0.18 for the regression of performance in the 
second experimental session on the treatment groups was essentially in agree­
ment with the data of Table 4. Both indicated that treatments had little 
relationship to experimental performance on the second task. 
As indicated in the table of correlations, not only did practice pre­
dict the immediately following experimental performance, but practice on 
the first task was also a strong predictor of all later sessions. In the 
regression analysis, the multiple R-square indicated that practice on the 
first task accounted for 56.2% of the variance in experimental performance 
on Task #1. This amount of variance was beyond that which would be expected 
by chance, for the F-test gave an F = 69.29 (p<.01). Similarly, the role 
of practice was demonstrated in the regression of Task #2 experimental per­
formance on practice for the second task. The multiple R-square showed that 
68.6% of the variance of experimental performance on Task #2 was predicted 
by the practice immediately preceding this session. The F = 118.25 signified 
that practice here too was a highly significant determinant (p<.01) of exper­
imental performance. If the practice covariate had been defined as all pre­
ceding performance sessions, in contrast to just the preceding practice ses­
sion, even more experimental variance would have been accounted for by co-
variance. In view of the high performance intercorrelations, however, such 
regressions were not performed. 
In the regression "2 on 1, 5-11", it was found that 66% of the variance 
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for the experimental session on Task #1 may be accounted for by a combina­
tion of treatments and the covariate of practice on Task #1. For the 
second task, the regression "4 on 3, 5-11" resulted in a multiple R-square 
value which indicated that 72% of the variance in experimental performance 
on Task #2 may be accounted for by the combination of treatments and the co­
variate of practice on Task #2. When the effect of the practice covariate 
Was removed, by subtraction, from the combination of treatments and prac­
tice, to allow for a more precise evaluation of treatment differences, the 
treatment mean square for the first task yielded an F = 0.20. When the 
practice effect was removed from the second task, the resulting treatment 
effect showed F = 0.87, which also was not significant. 
Thus, this study found the effects of the treatment variables to be 
virtually non-existent. No experimental effects were obtained after remov­
ing the effects of immediately preceding practice. No evidence was obtained 
of the utilization of either the social model or the hypothesized idiographic 
model of equity by this population. Rather, practice was found to have been 
highly significant in its effects on experimental behavior. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
It was interesting to note that the role of hospitalization, when seen 
as the covariate "percentage of the subject's life spent in a psychiatric 
hospital", was not nearly so potent as practice in its influence on exper­
imental performance. The last two regressions in Table 18 indicated that 
the percentage-hospitalization covariate predicted only 2.2% of the variance 
which this population showed during the experimental session for Task #1, 
and 12.6% of the variance of the second experimental session. Though the 
latter multiple R-square was significant (p<.01), it should be recalled 
that the respective values for the practice effects were 56.2% and 68.6%. 
As it was associated with performance, then, practice was more influential 
than pathology. 
In view of the major finding of this study, i.e., the effects of prac­
tice upon the two later experimental sessions, the absence of treatment 
effects in the second and third of Lawler et al.'s (1968) three successive 
experimental sessions is not surprising. It may be presumed that their 
first experimental session functioned as practice for the following sessions. 
The effects of such practice might easily have been sufficient to diminish 
the effects of treatment. In the present study, practice was both made ex­
plicit and arranged so as to precede the manipulation of the variables. With 
these modifications, experimental treatment effects were never observed. 
The procedure of the Lawler et al. (1968) study is replete with sugges­
tions that their subjects found little opportunity to define appropriate 
task behavior for themselves, apart from the definition generated by the 
inequity manipulation. For example, Lawler et al. (1968) reported: 
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"Despite the fact that many subjects asked how many inteirviews they could 
do or how much money they could make, the experimenter carefully avoided 
answering such questions" (p. 257), and "At no time did the experimenter 
comment on the quality of the subject's work or indicate his approval or 
disapproval with the subject's productivity" (p. 259). Instead, it appears 
that ambiguity in initial task performance was essential to the obtaining 
of treatment effects. 
Lawler et al. (1968) have reported that their instructions were con­
fined to the following; 
"Following the induction, each subject was given an inter­
viewer guide and a supply of interviewing sheets. The 
interviewer's guide gave several general suggestions for 
effective interviewing (e.g., ask questions in order shown 
on form and interview only people over 18). The instruc­
tions also told the subjects to "record"each interviewee's 
comments in sufficient detail to enable someone else to 
interpret correctly what was said... After the subject had 
a chance to read the interviewer guide and the interview 
form itself, they were again told to follow the instruc­
tions carefully and to return in two hours"(pp. 258-259). 
It was within such a setting that Lawler et al. obtained their equity treat­
ment effects (F = 17.38; p<.01) in the first session. However, when no in­
duction was repeated for the second and third sessionsj yet when all subjects 
had had the benefit of the first "practice" session, treatment effects were 
no longer significant. For these later sessions, the subjects' need for 
money was found to be a more efficient predictor of behavior, accounting for 
49% of the variance in productivity in the second and third sessions, while 
for only 26% in the first s^ sion. Thus when the basic design is expanded, 
to provide for more than a single observation, alternatives to the equity 
explanation appear, and are found to be quite predictive of behavior. 
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The specific task instructions given in other studies also seem in­
sufficient, particularly when they are contrasted with the typically lavish 
manipulations. For example, the original study by Adams and Rosenbaum 
(1962) reported the following as the extent to which the task (interviewing) 
was structured for the subject: 
was to interview adult members of the general public 
for approximately 2.5 hours and was to obtain approxi­
mately equal numbers of interviews with male and female 
respondents. No restrictions were placed on where 2 was 
to obtain interviews" (p. 162). 
However, the emphasis they gave to the manipulation must not have been as 
modest, for they add: 
"As ^  departed to begin work he was briefly reminded of 
the relation of his qualifications to his pay of $3.50 
per hour" (p. 162). 
Thus the manipulation may merely have provided the subject with short-
term normative expectations of appropriate task performance. These expec­
tations may be replaced by others which are formed during a period of exper­
ience with the task. However, the latter may be estimated only when the 
experimental design makes allowances for repeated observations of task 
performance. 
There were several methodological points of novelty in the present 
study, beyond the estimate which was made of practice effect and the use of 
an atypical sample of subjects. These may be listed as follows: (1) both 
input and outcome were fully varied for Person; (2) unbalanced ratios 
were used for Other; (3) Other was explicitly identified as a peer group; 
(4) outcomes were not specified as wages; (5) conditions of both over-
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and undercompensation were established; (6) two new tasks were developed. 
Any one of these variations should be considered significant from the point 
of view of design, and all should be further evaluated in each of their 
respective effects by future investigations. However, this study obtained 
such commanding effects due to practice that the relative effects of these 
other variations could not be estimated. Practice left little to discuss 
beyond the purely speculative. 
For instance, although it had been intended to evaluate the differen­
tial strength in the effects of the input and outcome variables of Other 
and Person, the practice covariate subsumed any such differential treatment 
effects. Likewise, conditions of under- and overcompensation were found 
to be no different in their effects than the equitable control condition, 
under each of the two models of equity and across each of the two tasks. 
The experimental behavior of the sample did not indicate that either Other 
(social) or historical Person (idiographic) was chosen as a model for 
experimental behavior. Rather, the data indicated that the sample maintained 
the performance rates which had been established in practice. 
The effects of practice on this population deserve further elabora­
tion. If expectations of appropriate performance are, indeed, generated 
during a practice period, how might these be described for this population? 
Having collected, as a group, 415.75 years of inpatient hospitalization, 
and averaging 7.42 years, this sample might easily be defined as "chronic". 
Did practice, then, offer this group of chronic schizophrenics anything 
beyond that which it would offer a normal population? 
A functional and dynamic view of the schizophrenic reaction is strong­
ly suggestive of this possibility. Defining the schizophrenic as one who 
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has discarded "common sense" and consensuality, Shulman (1968) considers 
the schizophrenic as one who must take steps to protect his private world: 
"He makes himself immune to logic and sentiment, two consensual ways of 
communicating by which it is possible for one person to influence another" 
(p. 11). In so doing, he is no longer answerable to anyone, for he is in­
dependent of the rules which others feel obliged to obey. When he has fi­
nally reached the level of chronicity, he "has a considerable investment in 
maintaining it against the pressures of his environment" (Shulman, 1968, 
p. 42). Therefore, in the face of impending "treatment", what better oppor­
tunity to generate and solidify rigid levels of performance than in a prac­
tice session? 
In addition, it is plausible to assume that the identification of the 
experimenter as a member of the DTC therapeutic staff was not without its 
influence. (For example, one might have anticipated a low rate of perform­
ance by the subjects so as to insure against the possibility of their later 
being given a similar job as a permanent work assignment. However, the 
wide range in the experimental performance scores, i.e., 2 to 217 on Task 
#1, and 1 to 45 on Task #2, did not suggest this strategy.) If by their 
chronicity the patients/subjects had already demonstrated their resistance 
to therapeutically-posed variables, one should not have expected them to 
be affected by experimental variables, for both were emanating from the 
same psychologist/experimenter, and both could have been seen as having 
the same (aversive) therapeutic purpose. 
If the questionnaire had been administered just prior to experimental 
performance, i.e.. Immediately following the manipulation, it could have 
been used as a measure of the strength of the manipulation. (The variables 
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may have been strong, but perhaps too strong, to the point of their posing 
a threat, for example, to the subjects' sense of competency.) But since 
the questionnaire was administered after the last session, its use was 
restricted to an estimate of the cognitive resolution of inequity. Future 
investigations should consider a check on the strength of the manipulation. 
Though such a check might tend to emphasize and thus reinforce the manipu­
lation, resulting, in effect, in a double induction, such an assessment is 
necessary as long as Adams maintains that inputs and outcomes are "as per­
ceived by" the person. 
The aura which might also have emanated from the experimenters and 
the situations of the previous research provides a logical point of simi­
larity between the biases of this and the previous studies, with the excep­
tion of Lawler et al, (1968). Just as the practice session and the experi­
menter of this study might have had an idiosyncratic effect on this chronic 
schizophrenic group, so too might college students as a group have been 
singularly affected by previous inductions and experimenters. With no 
provisions for practice, and with little description of appropriate task per­
formance, those college samples may be assumed to have been confronted with 
an employer/experimenter who implicitly yet very strongly suggested that 
it would be socially desirable if they would conform to the expectations of 
equity theory. Lawler and O'Gara (1967) have reported correlations of -0.36 
(p<.05) and -0.49 (p<.01) between productivity and, respectively, "sociabil­
ity" and "social presence" on the CPI. Thus, when underpaid on a piece rate 
schedule, those students who by self-report were not confident of their 
social skills were those who were most likely to follow the demands of the 
induction in the single experimental session. Indeed, Lawler and O'Gara 
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(1967) themselves have commented: "For these ^  it may be that raising pro­
ductivity presents the only concrete way of reducing these feelings of guilt 
and self-doubt, and showing the ^  and themselves that they are really worth­
while" (p. 409). 
It is suggested, therefore, that whereas the schizophrenic subjects 
of this study found the practice sessions to be particularly conducive to 
their later avoidance of treatments, samples of typical college sophomores 
seized upon the induction as an ideal occasion to actively exhibit their 
social abilities. Thus, practice, for the schizophrenics, precluded their 
later having to engage in consensual behavior. For the college students, 
however, the challenge of the induction demanded that they engage in con­
sensual behavior. This study has apparently biased its lack of results by 
providing a practice session which may have catered to the needs of its 
sample. Previous studies, on the other hand, have apparently biased their 
positive results by not providing a practice session which would offer an 
alternative, personally-generated norm for behavior. While this explana­
tion should be recognized as speculative, the suspected bias of each ap­
proach may readily be corrected through appropriate designs. 
It would appear essential that the validity of equity theory first be 
established in a normal population. Such a validation must account for the 
effects of practice. Specifically, practice sessions should be incorporated 
into the design of future studies which utilize college populations. If in 
so doing, the effects of practice are found to be negligible, and there con­
tinue to be equity effects, one may assume that the practice effect is 
specific to the population of this study. Secondly, future research with 
schizophrenic populations Should assure against secondary gains which may 
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be provided by a practice session, perhaps through the insertion of a 
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"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. 
You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably will find work 
like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and interesting kind of 
job, and the experience you'll get with this job should certainly help you 
in getting a very high paying office job in the Des Moines area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble nine packets in five min­
utes. You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't 
have to be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably will find 
work like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and interesting kind 
of job, and the experience you'll get with this job should certainly help 




"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though you 
have to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
will find work like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and inter­
esting kind of job, and the experience you'll get with this job should cer­
tainly help you in getting a very high paying office job in the Des Moines 
area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though you 
have to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
will find work like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and inter­
esting kind of job, and the experience you'll get with this job should cer­





"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though you 
have to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
won't find work like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting kind 
of job, and there just isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the 
Des Moines area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though one 
has to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
won't find work like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting kind 
of job, and there just isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the 




"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The merbers of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. 
You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably won't find work 
like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting job, and there just 
isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the Des Moines area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. They seem to have 
more than enough ability and experience, even though one has to have a real 
talent for paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Centers 
did not find work like this valuable to them. They just couldn't get inter­
ested in this kind of job, and there didn't seem to be much of a salary in 
this kind of work in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble nine packets in five min­
utes. You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't 
have to be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably won't find 
work like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting kind of job, 





"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. They don't seem to 
have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Cen­
ters found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to find­
ing it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they got 
with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high paying 
office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. 
You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably will find work 
like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and interesting kind of 
job, and the experience you'll get with this job should certainly help you 
in getting a very high paying office job in the Des Moines area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble nine packets in five minutes. They don't seem 
to have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have 
to be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day 
Centers found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to 
finding it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they 
got with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high pay­
ing office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble nine packets in five min­
utes. You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but one doesn't 
have to be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably will find 
work like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and interesting 
kind of job, and the experience you'll get with this job should certainly 




"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. They don't seem to 
have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Cen­
ters found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to find­
ing it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they got 
with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high paying 
office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though you 
have to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
will find work like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and inter­
esting kind of job, and the experience you'll get with this job should cer­
tainly help you in getting a very high paying office job in the Des Moines 
area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble nine packets in five minutes. They don't seem 
to have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have 
to be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day 
Centers found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to 
finding it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they 
got with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high pay­
ing office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though one 
has to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
will find work like this extremely valuable to you. It's a clean and inter­
esting kind of job, and the experience you'll get with this job should cer­





"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. They don't seem to 
have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Cen­
ters found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to find­
ing it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they got 
with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high paying 
office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 170 of these in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though you 
have to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
won't find work like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting kind 
of job, and there just isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the 
Des Moines area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble nine packets in five minutes. They don't seem 
to have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have 
to be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day 
Centers found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to 
finding it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they 
got with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high pay­
ing office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble 25 packets in five minutes. 
You seem to have more than enough ability and experience, even though one 
has to have a real talent for paper work to do it that well. You probably 
won't find work like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting kind 
of job, and there just isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the 




"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. They don't seem to 
have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day Cen­
ters found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to find­
ing it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they got 
with this job helped some of those men in getting some very high paying 
office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to sort 35 of these in five minutes. 
You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't have to 
be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably won't find work 
like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting job, and there just 
isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the Des Moines area." 
(Task #2) 
"I understand that the members of the Brooklyn and St. Paul Day Centers 
usually are able to assemble nine packets in five minutes. They don't seem 
to have enough ability and experience, but they say that one doesn't have 
to be good with paper work to do it that well. The members of those Day 
Centers found work like this extremely valuable to them. In addition to 
finding it to be a clean and interesting kind of job, the experience they 
got with this job helped some of those men in getting some vary high pay­
ing office jobs in the Brooklyn and St. Paul areas. 
"Now in your case, you could be able to assemble nine packets in five min­
utes. You don't seem to have enough ability and experience, but you don't 
have to be good with paper work to do it that well. You probably won't find 
work like this valuable to you. It's not a very interesting kind of job, 
and there just isn't much of a salary in this kind of work in the Des Moines 
area." 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE 
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How difficult would it be to work as fast as the men in Brooklyn and 
St. Paul? Would it be: 
very difficult (1) 
pretty difficult (2) 
not too bad (3) 
pretty easy (4) 
very easy (5) 
How difficult was it for you to work as fast as you were told you could? 
Was it: 
very easy (5) 
pretty easy (4) 
not too bad (3) 
pretty difficult (2) 
very difficult (1) 
How qualified do you think the men in Brooklyn and St. Paul are? 
Are they; 
highly qualified (1) 
above average (2) 
average (3) 
below average (4) 
very little (5) 
How much ability do you think you have for this kind of work? 
very little (5) 
below average (4) 
average (3) 
above average (2) 
a great deal (1) 
How valuable do you think the members of other Day Centers would find 
work like this? Would they find it: 
very valuable (1) 
pretty valuable (2) 
just average (3) 
a little (4) 
very little (5) 
How valuable do you think experience with this job might be to you? 
Will it be: 
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very little (5) 
a little (4) 
just average (3) 
pretty much (2) 
very much (1) 
7. How interesting might others find this job? Would they find it: 
extremely interesting (1) 
very interesting (2) 
OK (3) 
a little (4) 
not interesting (5) 
8. How interesting did you find this job? Was it: 
not at all interesting (5) 
a little (4) 
OK (3) 
very interesting (2) 
extremely interesting (1) 
9. How much did you like this job? 
very much (1) 
pretty much (2) 
in between (3) 
not much (4) 
not at all (5) 
10. What do you think would be a fair hourly salary for this kind of work? 
